To detect frauds by a dealer or some participants, researchers have proposed verifiable threshold quantum state sharing (VTQSTS) schemes. However, the existing VTQSTS schemes either have lowcomputation efficiency or weak security. In this paper, a verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum state sharing against denial attack (VTQSTS-ADA) scheme is proposed to overcome the above limitations, in which the dealer Alice encodes the quantum secret sequence into two quantum message sequences and a quantum signature sequence. First, for each participant in the authorization subset, the received quantum signature sequence is validated by a quantum verification algorithm, and then a unitary transformation with a rotation key is performed on the received quantum message sequence; next, a new quantum signature sequence is generated by a quantum signature algorithm with the signature key. Each participant sends the new message sequences and signature sequence to the next participant. The original quantum secret sequence can be reconstructed when t(t ≤ n) participants collaborate. The security analysis shows that the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme can detect the fraud instances raised by the dealer and participants and provide stronger security such as resisting denial attacks and man-in-middle attacks compared with the existing schemes. The performance analysis shows that the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme outperforms the earlier VTQSTS scheme and is comparable to the recent scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
To protect a classical secret, traditional secret sharing splits this secret into shares and distributes those shares among some of the participants. When the secret is needed, a certain number of participants cooperate to recover it. Based on physical theory, such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and quantum no-cloning theorem, the quantum secret sharing (QSS) generalization of traditional secret sharing in a quantum scenario protects classical or quantum secrets from being lost, destroyed, or altered. Therefore, QSS provides more prefect security than traditional secret sharing. By using the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state, Hillery et al. [1] proposed the QSS scheme first in 1999.
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Many QSS schemes have been proposed since then, and QSS has become known as a research hotspot in quantum cryptography.
Some of the existing QSS schemes are of the (n, n) threshold type, which requires all participants together to reconstruct the secret [2] - [10] . To improve the flexibility and practicability of the (n, n) threshold QSS schemes, some (t, n) threshold QSS schemes (TQSS) [11] - [20] have been proposed. The TQSS schemes require t or more than t participants out of n participants together to reconstruct the secret. In the existing TQSSs, schemes [11] , [18] are designed based on a quantum error correcting code, and schemes [13] , [17] , [19] are designed by using the traditional Shamir's threshold secret sharing [21] . At the same time, some schemes are designed by combining several types of threshold structures. As an example, Bai et al. [20] proposed a TQSS to realize three types of access structures, i.e., (n, n) threshold, restricted (3, n) threshold, and restricted (4, n) threshold.
The above (t, n) TQSS schemes focus only on how to reconstruct the original secret with t or more than t participants cooperating honestly via secure quantum channels. However, in realistic cases, the dealer could be dishonest and distribute some invalid shares to the participants. At the same time, some participants could also be dishonest and provide fake shares to reconstruct the original secret. To prevent these fraud instances, the verifiable (t, n) threshold QSS (VTQSS) schemes have been proposed to validate the shares. In 2011, Yang et al. [22] , [23] proposed two VTQSS schemes. Song and Liu [24] analyzed the security of the first VTQSS scheme [22] and found that it could not resist the participants' forgery attacks. In 2016, Qin and Dai [25] proposed a VTQSS by using the d-dimensional Bell state. In 2018, based on Shamir's threshold secret sharing, Lu et al. [26] proposed a VTQSS with a single d-level particle.
In most of the TQSS and VTQSS schemes, the secret and its shares are classical information, and the shares are converted into quantum states by a special encoding method and transmitted to the receivers via quantum channels. To improve the compatibility, some researchers designed quantum state sharing (QSTS) schemes [27] - [37] . In these schemes, the secret, the shares and the transmitted information are all quantum states. For example, Deng et al. [29] , [30] proposed two QSTS schemes that used an arbitrary two-particle state. By using four sets of W-class states, Nie et al. [32] designed a three-party QSTS scheme with single-qutrit-state sharing. Wei and Jiang [35] proposed a Multi-qudit QSTS using high-dimensional Bell channels. To improve the flexibility and practicability of the schemes, some researchers proposed threshold QSTS (TQSTS) schemes. Qin et al. [38] , Qin and Tso [39] proposed two TQSTS schemes, one using a phase shift operator and the other using entanglement swapping. Based on linear equations and unitary operations, Cao et al. [40] also proposed a TQSTS scheme.
Similar to TQSS, TQSTS is also vulnerable to malicious participants or dealers in current quantum cryptography. To solve this problem, some researchers proposed verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum state sharing (VTQSTS) schemes. In 2006, Benor et al. [41] proposed two VTQSTS schemes, which can tolerate partial cheaters among the participants and detect the deceptions of the dealer. However, the scheme in Benor et al. [41] requires some participants to detect the deceptions of the other participants, and thus, its computational cost is greatly increased. Recently, Cao and Ma [42] designed a VTQSTS scheme based on the properties of unitary operations and Bell states. In that scheme, the dishonest behavior of the previous participant could be detected by the next participant. That scheme can detect the deception of dishonest participants, but it cannot detect the deception of a dishonest dealer.
In this paper, a verifiable (t, n) threshold quantum state sharing against denial attack (VTQSTS-ADA) scheme is proposed to overcome these limitations. In the VTQSTS-ADA scheme, the dealer Alice encodes the quantum secret sequence into two quantum message sequences and a quantum signature sequence. For each participant in the authorization subset, the next participant validates the received quantum signature sequence from the previous participant, and generates two new quantum message sequences and a new quantum signature sequence. The original quantum secret sequence can be reconstructed when t(t ≤ n) participants collaborate. The contributions of the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme are as follows:
(1) A new quantum state digital signature (QSTDS) algorithm is designed to resist forgery attack and denial attack by dishonest dealer and dishonest participants. (2) To resist man-in-middle attack by external attacker, the identity of each authorized participant is embedded into the message sequences by using the shadow key generation sub-algorithm. (3) The rotation key is embedded into the phase shift unitary operator to resist the collusion attack by dishonest participants. (4) The pseudo-random permutation algorithm is used to replace the order of operations of the authorized participants, which reduces further the risk of collusion attack by dishonest participants. (5) The VTQSTS-ADA scheme outperforms the earlier VTQSTS scheme and is comparable to the recent scheme in terms of the efficiency. (6) The VTQSTS-ADA scheme's verification object is single, and authentication method is practical and feasible.
II. QUANTUM STATE DIGITAL SIGNATURE (QSTDS)
A quantum digital signature has the same attributes as a classical digital signature, e.g., non-forgeability, non-deniability, and authentication of the integrity and validity. Depending on the different states of the signed message, quantum digital signatures can be divided into two categories: quantum digital signature based on classical message (QDSBCM) and quantum state digital signature (QSTDS). In QDSBCM, the signature/verification key pair and the message are classical, and the signature is quantum state. In QSTDS, only the signature/verification key pair is classical; the message and signature are both quantum state. To achieve the verification function of the VTQSTS scheme, a QSTDS is constructed in this section.
A. DEFINITION OF QSTDS
Based on quantum one-time pad (QOTP), Zou and Qiu [43] designed an arbitrated quantum signature (AQS).
Gao et al. [44] argued that Zou and Qiu's AQS can be cracked by an existential forgery attack. Choi et al. [45] suggested that the (U,V)-type quantum encryption can enhance the security of the AQS. Kim et al. [46] Refs. [43] - [46] , we provide a definition for QSTDS as follows.
Definition 1 (QSTDS):
A QSTDS is a 3-tuple of the following quantum polynomial-time algorithms:
• Key generation algorithm G(1 λ ): on input of a security parameter λ, it generates a classical key pair (sk, vk).
• Quantum signature algorithm QSig(sk, |m ): on input of a signature key sk and a quantum message |m , it outputs a quantum signature |σ .
• Quantum verification algorithm QVer(vk, |m , |σ ): on input of a verification key vk, if |σ is the output of QSig(sk, |m ) then QVer(vk, |m , |σ ) is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. Where (sk, vk) ∈ classical key space K , |m ∈ quantum message space M , |σ ∈ quantum signature space A, QSig() ∈ set of quantum signature algorithm Sig, and QVer() ∈ set of quantum verification algorithm Ver. The algorithms Sig and Ver are families of quantum transformations.
The key generation algorithm G() should be a classical secure pseudorandom function (PRF) that meets the strong notion of security [47] . After choosing a random string with λ-bit and when G() is run twice, a signature/verification key pair (sk, vk) is obtained. The algorithm QSig() is a set of q operations {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U q }, and each operation is a 2 n × 2 n unitary matrix. The algorithm QVer() is a set of operations
where U † denotes the conjugate transpose of matrix U .
B. DESIGN OF QSTDS
According to Definition 1, a new QSTDS is designed. In this QSTDS, we assumed that quantum devices are ideal, i.e., they are not disturbed by noise, and do not lose quantum state during communications.
The system takes λ as a security parameter and runs the key generation algorithm G(1 λ ) to generate a classical key pair (sk, vk) ∈ {0, 1} 3m , where the signature key sk is the same as the verification key vk, and the key pair is shared between the signer Alice and the verifier Bob.
2) QUANTUM SIGNATURE ALGORITHM QSig()
Quantum signature algorithm QSig() consists of two parts: the random rotation operator {R µ = σ µ } µ∈Z 4 and the quantum encryption operator {E v = σ v W } v∈Z 4 , where 
where w v ∈ R, w 0 ≥ 0, and v∈Z 4 w 2 v = 1. For all qubit message to not be forgeable, at least three w v s should be non-zero [46] . Let ψ be a quantum message sequence that consists of m particles {|ϕ u = α u |0 +β u |1 |u = 1, 2, . . . , m}, where α u , β u are complex numbers that satisfy |α u | 2 + |β u | 2 = 1. Alice chooses the operators R µ = σ 3 , E v = σ 1 W to sign her quantum message sequence ψ by using the quantum signature algorithm QSig(). The QSig() is defined by
)|ϕ u |u = 1, 2, . . . , m}
where k (q) denotes the q th bit of the key sk A,B . Alice sends the message sequence and the signature sequence (ψ, S) to the verifier Bob via an error-free quantum channel.
3) QUANTUM VERIFICATION ALGORITHM QVer()
After receiving the message sequence and the signature sequence (ψ, S) from Alice, Bob checks the validity of the signature sequence S by using the following quantum verification algorithm QVer():
)|s u |u = 1, 2, . . . , m}
where U † denotes the conjugate transpose of matrix U , and |s u denotes the u th particle of the signature sequence S. For Eq. (3), Bob verifies the signature sequence S with the key vk A,B . If the signature sequence S is the output of the signature algorithm QSig() with overwhelming probability, Bob accepts it, otherwise he rejects it. The details of the verification processes of the algorithm QVer() are described as follows. For each particle |ϕ u (u = 1, 2, . . . , m), Bob compares it with |ϕ u by using the quantum swap test circuit (QSTC) proposed in Ref. [48] . By Tracing the execution of QSTC, Bob judges whether two arbitrary quantum states are identical or not. If they are identical, the measurement result of QSTC must be |0 . In contrast, if two qubits are different, the measurement result of QSTC could be |0 with a probability of (1 + ε 2 )/2 and |1 with a probability of (1 − ε 2 )/2, where ε (0 ≤ ε < 1) is the inner product of the two compared qubits.
C. EXAMPLE 1
This subsection provides a successful example to understand the QSTDS scheme clearly.
Let the parameter m be set to 4 (m = 4); then, the quantum message sequence is defined by
According to Eq. 
If the key pair is (sk, vk) = (011100101110, 011100101110), according to Eq. (2), then the quantum signature sequence generated by Alice is
3 )|ϕ 3 , (σ
When the sequences (ψ, S) are transmitted to Bob, according to Eq. (3), Bob generates a new quantum message sequence ψ as
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k (12) )|s 4 } Bob checks as to whether the generated message sequence ψ is the same as the received message sequence ψ or not by a QSTC. As a result, the output of the QSTC is |0 . This result shows that the verification is successful and the signature sequence is valid.
D. SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED QSTDS
In Eq.(1), for all qubit messages to not be forgeable, there are at least three w v 's that should be non-zero [47] . We take
as an assistant unitary operator to design our QSTDS, which can meet the unforgeability requirement. The reasons are as follows.
Let 
In other words, compared with any other two unitary W j and W v , W 1 is one of the farthest unitary operators from the identity operator. Therefore, the operator W 1 could be considered to be a good assistant unitary operator for our QSTDS scheme without forgeable messages.
III. THE PROPOSED VTQSTS-ADA
In the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme, Alice is an honest dealer, who owns a master key and a quantum secret sequence. Bob 1 , Bob 2 , . . . , Bob n are the n participants. Each participant holds a shadow key, a rotation key and a signature/ verification key pair. There are some authorized subsets and unauthorized subsets in the set of participants. Only the authorized subset can reconstruct the original quantum secret sequence, and the unauthorized subset cannot obtain any information about the secret sequence. The dealer Alice designates Bob 1 as a trusted reconstructor for each authorized subset. His task is to collect the fewest shares from an authorized subset to reconstruct the secret. The proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme includes the initialization stage, secret state sharing stage, and secret state reconstruction stage.
A. INITIALIZATION STAGE
The system runs the key generation algorithm KeyGen() to generate a series of initial keys. The algorithm KeyGen() consists of the following three sub-algorithms, which are run to generate the shadow key, the rotation key, and the signature/ verification key pair, respectively.
1) SHADOW KEY GENERATION SUB-ALGORITHM ShadKeyGen()
The sub-algorithm ShadKeyGen() builds a polynomial with degree t − 1:
Successively, the sub-algorithm randomly selects n distinct and nonzero values {x i = I D i ∈ Z d |i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}} as the identities of n participants and publishes them among the participants. Further, the sub-algorithm takes x i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) as an input to calculate the shadow key
Alice owns a master key mk = a 0 , and each participant Bob i owns a shadow key wk i .
2) ROTATION KEY GENERATION SUB-ALGORITHM RotaKeyGen()
The sub-algorithm RotaKeyGen() generates n rotation keys {γ i ∈ [0, 2π ]|i = 1, 2, . . . , n}. These rotation keys are shared by the reconstructor Bob 1 and the participant Bob i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
3) SIGNATURE/VERIFICATION KEY GENERATION SUB-ALGORITHM SigVerKeyGen()
The sub-algorithm SigVerKeyGen() generates a series of key pairs {sk ω,i , vk ω,i ∈ {0, 1} 3m |ω = A, 1, 2, . . . , n; 
(ii) Alice performs the phase shift operation U (θ A ) on each particle of the secret sequence ψ 0 , obtaining two message sequences ψ A andψ A , where
and
d . The generation method ofψ A is the same as that of ψ A , and each particle of the two sequences is also the same.
(iii) Alice runs the quantum signature algorithm QSig() to sign the message sequenceψ A with the signature key sk A,1 , obtaining the signature sequence S A,1 :
where the signature key sk A,1 is shared by Alice and the participant Bob 1 .
(iv) To prevent an eavesdropping attack, Alice prepares decoy particles that are chosen randomly from the set 
C. SECRET STATE RECONSTRUCTION STAGE
In the QSS scheme, the collection of all authorized subsets is denoted by , and the collection of all unauthorized subsets is denoted by . The tuple ( , ) is called the access structure if ∩ = ∅ and ∪ = 2 P , where P is the set of participants that are involved in the secret sharing [49] . In the access structure of the (t, n) QSS scheme, each authorized subset has ≥ t participants. On some special occasions, one or more participants might not take part in the reconstruction process because of illness, holiday, and so on. Let t be the threshold value of the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme; if t participants can cooperate to reconstruct the secret sequence, then more than t participants certain to be able to cooperate to accomplish this reconstruction.
In the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme, we assumed that the set of n participants is {Bob 1 , Bob 2 , . . . , Bob n }. The reconstructor Bob 1 chooses at random t participants from the set to generate an authorized subset (including himself). Bob 1 chooses j 1 = 1 as his own index, and then, he generates a new
for each of the other participants of the subset by using a pseudo-random permutation ρ(), where I D r is an identity message of the r th participant. Now, the authorized subset is {Bob j 1 , Bob j 2 , Bob j 3 , . . . , Bob j t }. The following steps will reconstruct the original quantum secret sequence.
(i) After obtaining the message squences and the signature sequence (ψ A ,ψ A , S A,1 ), Bob 1 runs the verification algorithm QVer() to check whether
or not. If Eq. (12) holds, then Bob 1 accepts Alice's signature sequence; otherwise, he rejects it.
(ii) Bob 1 fetches out his private shadow key wk j 1 and rotation key γ j 1 , and then, he performs the phase shift operation U (θ j 1 − γ j 1 ) on each particle of the message sequence ψ A , obtaining two message sequences ψ j 1 andψ j 1 , where
The generation method ofψ j 1 is the same as that of ψ j 1 , and each particle of the two sequences is also the same. (iii) Bob 1 runs the signature algorithm QSig() to sign the sequenceψ j 1 with the signature key sk j 1 ,j 2 as follows:
After Bob 1 has generated the signature sequence S j 1 ,j 2 , he sends the message sequences and the signature sequence with the decoy particles (ψ j 1 ,ψ j 1 , S j 1 ,j 2 ) to Bob j 2 .
(iv) Bob j 2 does a similar operation as Bob 1 does in Step (i)-(iii) and sends the message sequences and the signature sequence with the decoy particles (ψ j 2 ,ψ j 2 , S j 2 ,j 3 ) to Bob j 3 . Bob j 3 does a similar operation as Bob j 2 . This process continues until the message sequences and the signature sequence with the decoy particles (ψ j t−1 ,ψ j t−1 , S j t−1 ,j t ) are transmitted to the participant Bob j t . After Bob j t has finished his operations, he sends the sequences with the decoy particles (ψ j t ,ψ j t , S j t ,j 1 ) back to the reconstructor Bob 1 . The transmission route is determined to be:
(v) By using the verification key vk j t ,j 1 , Bob 1 verifies whether the signature sequence S j t ,j 1 is valid or not. If S j t ,j 1 is valid, then Bob 1 takes out t rotation keys {γ j r |r = 1, 2, . . . , t} and performs the composite operation U (γ j 1 + γ j 2 + · · · + γ j t ) on each particle of the message sequence ψ j t , recovering the original secret sequence {|ϕ 1,0 , |ϕ 2,0 , . . . , |ϕ m,0 }.
D. EXAMPLE 2
To present clearly the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme, we give the following example:
In the initialization stage, the sub-algorithm ShadKeyGen() inputs the parameters (n = 5, t = 3, d = 7) to build a 2-degree polynomial f (x) = (4 + 5x + 2x 2 ) mod 7, where the coefficients are {a 0 = 4, a 1 = 5, a 2 = 2}. The master key mk = a 0 = 4 is held by Alice. Upon the input of 5 parameters {x 1 = 1, x 2 = 2, . . . , x 5 = 5}, the polynomial f (x) outputs 5 shadow keys {f (1) In the secret state sharing stage, we assumed that a quantum secret sequence is ψ 0 = {|ϕ 1,0 , |ϕ 2,0 , |ϕ 3,0 , |ϕ 4,0 } = {|1 ,
) on the secret sequence ψ 0 , obtaining the message sequence
The generation and verification processes of the signature sequence S A,1 are similar to Example 1, and the insertion and elimination processes of the decoy particles are omitted. In the secret state reconstruction stage, we assumed that the authorized subset is{Bob j 1 , Bob j 2 , Bob j 3 }, where {j 1 = 1,
Bob 1 performs U (θ j 1 − γ j 1 ) on the message sequence ψ A , obtaining
When the quantum message sequences travel around the transmission route Alice → Bob 1 → Bob j 2 → Bob j 3 → Bob 1 , VOLUME 7, 2019 they are sent back to the reconstructor Bob 1 . Bob 1 performs the composite operation U (γ j 1 + γ j 2 + γ j 3 ) on ψ j 3 , which evolves as ψ 1
+ cos(ζ )|1 ), cos(ζ )|0 + sin(ζ )|1 }, ) mod 7 = 2π . Obviously, the quantum sequence ψ 1 is the original secret sequence ψ 0 .
IV. CORRECTNESS PROOF
In a TQSS scheme, an authorized subset can exactly reconstruct the original scecret, and an unauthorized subset cannot acquire any information on the secret [31] ; the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme is no exception. In the scheme, every subset is either authorized or unauthorized, which implies that an unauthorized subset is the complement of an authorized subset.
Theorem 1: For any two phase shift operations U (θ i ), U (θ j ) ∈ {U (θ 1 ), U (θ 2 ), . . . , U (θ t )}, if they are performed on any one of the particles of the quantum message sequence, e.g. |ϕ u,v (u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, v ∈ {A, 1, 2, . . . , t}), then there is a relationship
For the proof of Theorem 1, we refer to Ref. [7] . From Theorem 1, we know that the execution order of the phase shift operations does not need to be considered during the secret state reconstruction stage, and therefore, the reconstructor Bob 1 can deduce the composite operation of all of the participants of the authorized subset by performing module addition on the rotation angle θ.
Lemma 1: We assumed that a random authorized subset is {Bob j 1 , Bob j 2 , . . . , Bob j t }, when all of the participants of the authorized subset follow the steps in the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme, then the original quantum secret sequence can be reconstructed.
Proof: We take any one |ϕ u,0 (u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}) of the particles of the original secret sequence ψ 0 as a special instance to present our proof. During the secret state sharing stage, when Alice performs the phase shift operation U (θ A ) on the particle |ϕ u,0 , it evolves into U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 . After Alice has signed it with key sk A,1 , the message particle and the signature particle should be (U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 , QSig(sk A,1 , U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 )). During the secret state reconstruction stage, if each participant Bob j r (r = 1, 2, . . . , t) in the authorized subset has verified the validity of the received signature particle and performed the phase shift operations U (θ j r − γ j r ) on the received message particle, then the initial particle |ϕ u,0 evolves into
After receiving the particle |ϕ u,j t , Bob 1 performs the composite operation U (γ j 1 +γ j 2 +· · ·+γ j t ) on it, and it evolves as
The following conclusion can be drawn by Lagrange interpolation:
When the signature particle QSig(sk A,1 , U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 ) is sent to the participant Bob 1 , Bob 1 verifies its validity by using the verification algorithm QVer(). For each path of the transmission route from Bob 1 to Bob j t , the previous participant signs the transformed particle and the next participant verifies the validity of the signature particle. When the particle |ϕ u,j t is sent to the participant Bob 1 and recovered as |ϕ u,0 , all signature and verification processes have been completed. When all particles |ϕ u,0 (u = 1, 2, . . . , m) are recovered, the original quantum secret sequence ψ 0 is reconstructed.
Lemma 2: Any one of the unauthorized subsets cannot acquire any valuable information on the secret sequence.
Proof: Choose any particle from the original secret sequence ψ 0 , i.e., |ϕ u,0 (u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}), as a special instance to prove this Lemma. Two assumptions are considered:
Assumption 1: the reconstructor Bob 1 belongs to the unauthorized subset.
For the first assumption, suppose that Bob 1 belongs to unauthorized subset {Bob 1 , Bob j t+3 , Bob j t+4 , . . . , Bob j n }, where t < n < 2t. When the message particle and the signature particle (U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 , QSig(sk A,1 , U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 )) are sent to the participant Bob 1 , Bob 1 verifies the validity of the signature particle and performs U (θ j 1 − γ j 1 ) on the message particle. If each participant Bob j r (r = t + 3, t + 4, . . . , n) has verified the validity of the received signature particle and performed the phase shift operations U (θ j r − γ j r ) on the received message particle, then the initial particle |ϕ u,0 evolves as |ϕ u,j n (18) After receiving the particle |ϕ u,j n from Bob j n , Bob 1 performs the composite operation U (γ j 1 + γ j r+3 + · · · + γ j n ) on it, and it evolves as
Everyone knows that it is impossible to reconstruct the polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + a 2 x 2 + · · · + a t−1 x t−1 ∈ Z d , when the number of interpolation points is less than t. Given
can not be recovered correctly, and the unauthorized subset cannot acquire any information on the secret sequence.
Assumption 2: the reconstructor Bob 1 does not belong to the unauthorized subset.
Suppose that the unauthorized subset is {Bob j t+2 , Bob j t+3 , . . . , Bob j n }, where t < n < 2t, and the reconstructor Bob 1 does not belong to this subset. Then Alice's message particle and signature particle (U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 , QSig(sk A,1 , U (θ A )|ϕ u,0 )) are not shared among the unauthorized subset. Regardless of how the participants in the subset operate, the original secret sequence cannot be reconstructed.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
Security analysis estimates a cryptographic protocol's security level, finds potential loopholes and attempts to overcome the security issues. In this section, we analyze the security of the VTQSTS-ADA scheme against some typical security attacks. Additionally, we compare the VTQSTS-ADA scheme with the other similar schemes.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we will analyze the security of the VTQSTS-ADA scheme against intercept-resend attack, entangle-measure attack, forgery attack, denial attack, collusion attack, and man-in-middle attack.
1) INTERCEPT-RESEND ATTACK
Suppose that Eve is an illegal participant or external attacker whose computing power is only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics. Eve intercepts the message sequences and the signature sequence sent by Alice or the participants in the transmission route of FIGURE 1. Then, Eve resends the forged sequence in hopes of passing the eavesdropping detection. Let the total number of message particles and signature particles be 3m and the total number of decoy particles be . If Eve chooses randomly a particle from the intercepted sequences, then the probability that it is a decoy particle is l/(3m + l). Because each decoy particle is randomly chosen from one of the states {|+ , |− , |1 , |0 }, when Eve measures the decoy particle by using Z-basis or X-basis, the probability that she selects the wrong basis is (1/2). If Eve uses the wrong basis to measure the decoy particle, its state will be changed and the resulting errors will be detected. The eavesdropping attack of Eve to decoy particles could cause some errors to be detected with the probability 1−
The larger the parameters m and are, the larger the probability. When m and l are sufficiently large, the probability will converge to 1. On each transmission path of the VTQSTS-ADA scheme, the message sequences and the signature sequence are protected by decoy particles. Therefore, in the intercept-resend attack, Eve cannot succeed.
2) ENTANGLE-MEASURE ATTACK
Suppose that Eve has intercepted any two particles {|ϕ i = α i |0 i + β i |1 i ,|ϕ j = α j |0 j + β j |1 j } in the transmission route of FIGURE 1 and has prepared four ancillary particles {|0 a , |1 a ,| + a , | − a }. For each ancillary particle, Eve first takes the particle |ϕ i as the control particle and the ancillary particle as the target particle to perform the CNOT operation. Then she takes the particle |ϕ j as the control particle and the transformed ancillary particle as the target particle to perform the CNOT operation again. If the initiate ancillary particle is |0 0 a , after the first transformation, the ancillary particle evolves into |0 1 a . The transformation results of the two CNOT operations are described as follows:
If Eve measures the ancillary particle by using the computational basis {|0 , |1 }, she obtains |0 a . Similarly, if the initial ancillary particle is |1 0 a , then the measurement outcome is |1 a . If the initial ancillary particles are |+ 0 a , |− 0 a and the computational basis is {|+ , |− }, the measurement outcomes are | + a , | − a . In other words, the ancillary particles do not carry any information about the particles {|ϕ i ,|ϕ j }. Therefore, the entangle-measure attack is unsuccessful.
3) FORGERY ATTACK
During the secret state reconstruction stage, we assumed that Bob j e is a dishonest participant in the authorized subset. After receiving the message sequence and the signature sequence (ψ j e−1 ,ψ j e−1 , S j e−1 ,j e ) from Bob j e−1 , Bob j e forges a false message sequenceψ * j e instead of the real message sequenceψ j e . Then Bob j e runs the quantum signature algorithm QSig() to generate the signature sequence S * j e ,j e+1 = QSig(sk j e ,j e+1 ,ψ * j e ) with the key sk j e ,j e+1 , and then, sends the sequences (ψ * are passed along to the reconstructor Bob 1 , the original secret sequence cannot be reconstructed.
To determine who is the deceiver, Bob 1 traces each transmission path in FIGURE 1. When Bob 1 traces the communication between Bob j e and Bob j e+1 , Bob 1 believes that the deceiver is not Bob j e+1 , but Bob j e . The reason for this conclusion is two-fold:
One reason is that although the sequences (ψ * j e ,ψ * j e , S * j e ,j e+1 ) are fake, the signature key sk j e ,j e+1 is true. The forged signature sequence S * j e ,j e+1 can pass the validation of the receiver Bob j e+1 , but Bob j e+1 cannot forge another false signature sequence instead of the received sequence [46] .
The other reason is that the signature key sk j e ,j e+1 is shared by both communicating parties Bob j e and Bob j e+1 , and no information about the signature key is leaked to the other participants. Since the receiver Bob j e+1 and the other participants do not forge the false signature sequence, the deceiver must be the signer Bob j e . Thus, the VTQSTS-ADA scheme can resist forgery attacks.
4) DENIAL ATTACK
During the secret state sharing stage, Alice signs each particle of the message sequenceψ A with the signature key sk A,1 , which is held only by herself and the verifier. During the secret state reconstruction stage, each participant Bob j r (r = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1) signs the transformed message sequenceψ j r with the signature key sk j r ,j r+1 , which is held by only the signer Bob j r and the verifier Bob j r+1 , and the other participants do not know it. When the receiver Bob j r+1 verifies the signature sequence from the sender Bob j r , provided it has been properly validated, the sender Bob j r cannot disavow his signature sequence. In the forgery attack, we have proven that the receiver and the other participants cannot forge the false signature sequence, and the signature sequence is not sent back to the sender after the receiver has verified it; thus, the denial attack is invalid in the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme.
5) COLLUSION ATTACK
During the secret state reconstruction stage, in the authorized subset {Bob 1 , Bob j 2 , Bob j 3 , . . . , Bob j t }, only Bob 1 is honest, and one or more other participants could be dishonest. For a collusion attack, we consider the following three assumptions.
Assumption 1: Suppose that Bob j e−1 and Bob j e+1 are dishonest.
After receiving the sequence ψ j e−2 , Bob j e−1 performs the phase shift operation U (θ j e−1 − γ j e−1 ) on each particle of the sequence ψ j e−2 to obtain the sequence ψ j e−1 , and then, he sends ψ j e−1 to Bob j e . Similarly, after receiving the sequence ψ j e−1 , Bob j e also performs the phase shift operation U (θ j e − γ j e ) on ψ j e−1 to generate ψ j e , and then, he sends ψ j e to Bob j e+1 . In this case, for any particle |ϕ u,0 (u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}) of the sequence ψ 0 , its transformation processes can be as follows: If the t − 1 participants {Bob j 2 , Bob j 3 , . . . , Bob j t } are all dishonest, each of them sends his own quantum message sequence to other t − 2 participants. In addition, Bob j 2 holds the quantum message sequence ψ j 1 sent by the participant Bob 1 . In other words, the quantum message sequences {ψ j 1 , ψ j 2 , . . . ,ψ j t } are shared by the t − 1 participants {Bob j 2 , Bob j 3 , . . . , Bob j t }. However, because the t − 1 participants do not know the quantum message sequence ψ A of the dealer Alice, and do not know the rotation key γ j 1 of the participant Bob 1 , they cannot obtain the rotation parameter θ j 1 of the participant Bob 1 despite the Equation ψ j 1 = U (θ j 1 −γ j 1 )(ψ A ). Thus, even if the t−1 participants {Bob j 2 , Bob j 3 , . . . , Bob j t } collaborate together, they cannot attack the privacy of Bob 1 .
By an extension of the three assumptions, even if any two or more of the participants collaborate together, they cannot recovery the original quantum secret sequence. Therefore, the VTQSTS-ADA scheme can defeat collusion attacks.
6) MAN-IN-MIDDLE ATTACK
In a man-in-middle attack, the attacker Eve can secretly relay and possibly alter the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other. In the VTQSTS-ADA scheme, the message sequences and the signature sequence are transmitted with the decoy particles mode from one participant Bob j r to the next Bob j r+1 . Suppose that the quantum channel between Bob j r and Bob j r+1 is controlled by the attacker Eve; then, her man-in-middle attack strategies should be considered from the following three assumptions.
Assumption 1: Suppose that the attacker Eve has intercepted the transmitted quantum sequences and measured them; because she does not know the positions and bases of the decoy particles, her eavesdropping will be detected with the probability 1 − ) cannot pass the verification of the receiver Bob j r+1 because the equal probability for the two signature keys sk j e ,j r+1 and sk j r ,j r+1 is rather minimal.
Assumption 3: Suppose that Eve has passed the verification of the receiver Bob j r+1 with a rather minimal probability, and the forged message sequence ψ * j r andψ * j r are forwarded to the participant Bob 1 . The identities of the t participants are not identical and the indexes that are generated by these identities are not identical; in addition, the shadow keys generated by these indexes as input parameters are of course not identical. The identities of the t participants have been embedded into the message sequences and the signature sequence. Even if Bob 1 performs the composite unitary operation on the received message sequence, he cannot reconstruct the original secret sequence. Bob 1 can infer from it that there exists at least one deceiver or one attacker during the transmissions of the quantum sequences, and he will terminate the protocol. Finally, Eve cannot obtain any valuable information in a man-in-middle attack.
B. SECURITY COMPARISON
The schemes VTQSTS [42] , SMQCSHM-WQSS [41] , SMQCSHM-VQSS [41] and the proposed VTQSTS-ADA have three common features, namely (t, n) threshold, secret state sharing and verification function. Based on the security analysis of the previous subsection, we compare the security of the four schemes from the following seven different aspects: resisting intercept-resend attack, resisting entanglemeasure attack, resisting forgery attack, resisting denial attack, resisting collusion attack, resisting man-in-middle attack, and tracing faulty dealer and participants. The details are shown in TABLE 1.
We know from TABLE 1 that all four schemes can resist intercept-resend attack, entangle-measure attack, forgery attack and collusion attack. In SMQCSHM-VQSS, if a measurement result on R i,j fails the validation process, then P j is faulty. If R i is not properly reconstructed as a state, which is not validated by the dealer, then P i is faulty. If the top level does not decode to |0 , then the dealer is faulty. In the proposed VTQSTS-ADA scheme, the next participant Bob j r+1 (r = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1) verifies the signature sequence from the previous participant Bob j r ; if it fails the validation process, then the previous participant Bob j r is faulty. Bob 1 verifies the signature sequence from the dealer Alice; if it is not authenticated, then Alice is faulty. Due to the use of signature keys and rotation keys, in addition to the attacks that other schemes can resist, VQSTTSS-ADA can also resist denial attack by the distributor and participants as well as man-inmiddle attack by external attacker.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
To make a fair comparison, in VTQSTS and VTQSTS-ADA schemes, the number of secret particles is denoted by m, the number of decoy particles is denoted by l, and there is a relationship m ≤ l. In SMQCSHM-WQSS and SMQCSHM-VQSS schemes, the security parameter is denoted by s. The number of secret particles is assumed to be equal to the security parameters m = s. There is relationship between the total number of the participants n and the number of the authorized participants t, t ≤ n. There is a relationship between qudit and qubit, 1qudit = log 2 d qubits =mqubits. This section analyzes and compares the four schemes from three aspects of multiple entities, performance, verification methods, details of which are shown in TABLE2, TABLE 3  and TABLE 4 , respectively.
As shown in TABLE 2, the human resource consumptions of SMQCSHM-WQSS and SMQCSHM-VQSS are higher than those of VTQSTS and VTQSTS-ADA because SMQCSHM-WQSS and SMQCSHM-VQSS both require a dealer, n participants, a reconstructor, and a TTP. However, VTQSTS and VTQSTS-ADA both take any one of the honest participants as a reconstructor and do not need a TTP.
In TABLE 3 , U , Enco, Auth, SUM , Meas, Deco, Tele, Sig, Each and Ver represent the unitary operator, encoding, authentication, sum, measurement, decoding, teleportation, signature, eavesdropping checking, and verification, respectively. This section analyzes and compares the performance of the four schemes from three aspects of prepared particles, computation operations, transmission particles, the details of which are shown as follows:
A. PREPARED PARTICLES
In SMQCSHM-WQSS, the dealer encodes the zero states of 2m + 2 qudits into the shares of (2m + 2)n qudits by using quantum polynomial code. In SMQCSHM-VQSS, VOLUME 7, 2019 in addition to the particles prepared by SMQCSHM-WQSS, for each share, each of n participants first generates the new zero states of 2m + 2 qudits and then encodes these new zero states into the shares of (2m + 2)n qudits. In VTQSTS-ADA, only the secret particles of m qubits and the decoy particles of (t + 1) × l qubits need to be prepared. The number of prepared particles of VTQSTS-ADA is the smallest and that of SMQCSHM-VQSS is the largest.
B. COMPUTATION OPERATIONS
In SMQCSHM-WQSS, each share is transmitted to the participant by using the authenticated channel. Each of n participants performs purification test by iterating sum and measurement operations. The dealer decodes the EPR-half received from each of n participants, and sends the secret by using quantum teleportation. In SMQCSHM-VQSS, for each share, each of the participants calls SMQCSHM-WQSS to perform all computation operations. Suppose that the overhead of each computational operation in TABLE 3 is roughly equal; then, the number of computation operations of SMQCSHM-VQSS is the largest, followed by that of SMQCSHM-WQSS. As for VTQSTS and VTQSTS-ADA, if 0 < t ≤ 9, then the number of computation operations of VTQSTS is less than that of VTQSTS-ADA. If 9 < t ≤ n, in contrast, the number of computation operations of VTQSTS is more than that of VTQSTS-ADA.
C. TRANSMISSION PARTICLES
In SMQCSHM-WQSS, the dealer transmits the shares of (2m + 2)n qudits to n participants, afterwards, n participants send the EPR-halfs of n qudits to the dealer.
In SMQCSHM-VQSS, for each of the shares of (2m + 2)n qudits, SMQCSHM-WQSS is called once. The participant Bob j sends EPR-half to the participant Bob i , and the participant Bob i decodes the zero-share and sends it back to the dealer. The number of transmission particles of SMQCSHM-VQSS is the largest, and that of VTQSTS is the smallest. The number of transmission particles of VTQSTS-ADA is more than that of VTQSTS and less than that of any one of the other two schemes.
In TABLE 4 , VTQSTS verifies the objects by using the properties of unitary operations and Bell states, and VTQSTS-ADA verifies the objects by using the verification algorithm QVer(). In the two schemes, the verification methods are both one-to-one. In SMQCSHM-WQSS, by using zero purity test, each participant verifies the message particle from the dealer, and TTP verifies the message particles from some participants. The verification methods of SMQCSHM-WQSS include many to one, one to many. In addition to these two verification methods, SMQCSHM-VQSS adopts also many-to-many verification method, i.e., some participants verify the message particles from other participants. The verification methods of SMQCSHM-VQSS are the most diverse, and those of VTQSTS-ADA and VTQSTS are simpler than those of the other two schemes. The verification methods of SMQCSHM-VQSS and VTQSTS-ADA are more secure than those of the other two schemes because they can trace the frauds of the dealer and the participants.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a VTQSTS-ADA scheme is proposed, in which a quantum state secret sequence is encoded into two quantum message sequences and a quantum signature sequence, which are sent to the participant Bob 1 . The t(t ≤ n) participants collaborate to reconstruct the original quantum state secret sequence. Compared with the three similar schemes, in addition to the attacks they can resist, VQSTTSS-ADA can also resist denial attacks by the distributor and participants as well as man-in-middle attacks by external attackers. VQSTTSS-ADA is simpler and provides lower computational complexity when 9 < t ≤ n. VQSTTSS-ADA offers a general and practical quantum secret sharing scheme that could one day be adopted in a widespread manner in the future quantum communication environment.
